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Abstract
This paper considers the impact of di¤erences in endogenous technological change
between two countries on global pollution emissions under international strategic
interaction in environmental policies. First, we demonstrate that an environmen-
tally lagging countrys technology may continue to advance through a learning-
by-doing e¤ect until it exceeds the environmental friendliness of a leading country
that initially had the cleanest technology (i.e., environmental leapfrogging could
occur). Whether a country eventually becomes an environmentally leading country
depends on the country size and its awareness of environmental quality. Second, we
nd that global emissions may increase despite the fact that environmental tech-
nology advances in both countries. Global emissions eventually become constant
because both countries cease to tighten environmental regulations when their tech-
nologies are su¢ ciently clean. The nal emissions might be larger than emissions
in early stages of adjustment under dirty technologies. If environmental leapfrog-
ging frequently occurs, both countries possess similarly clean technologies, thereby
reducing long-term global pollution.
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1 Introduction
In order to control and limit climate change, long-term greenhouse gas emissions need to
be reduced.1 Given that alternative energy sources to fossil fuels, such as photovoltaic
and wind power, are currently available at high cost, technological progress will be a
key component of the long-term strategy to mitigate global greenhouse gas emissions
without compromising economic growth.2 Although developed countries have been re-
sponsible for most of the greenhouse gas emissions historically, in the coming decades,
increasing emissions will be mainly caused by economic growth in developing countries
(IPCC, 2007; OECD, 2012). It is argued that by leapfrogging straight to clean produc-
tion paradigms, developing countries may be able to bypass the dirty stages of industrial
growth experienced in the past by todays developed countries (IPCC, 2007; World Bank,
2003). Existing empirical evidence indicates that environmental leapfrogging in develop-
ing countries is possible provided a number of basic conditions are met (e.g., absorptive
capacity, technology transfer, and environmental policy) and the key factors for success
are di¤erent in each case.3
The purpose of this paper is to clarify the basic mechanism of the development and
adoption of new clean technologies in the long-run in a two-country framework. In par-
ticular, we focus on how environmental leapfrogging occurs and a¤ects global pollution
emissions. Each countrys environmental policy plays a critical role in technological
change. Adoption of clean technologies induced by environmental policy in one country
may reduce the other countrys incentive for strict environmental policy that leads to
development of new clean technologies. In other words, strategic interaction between
countries might hamper long-term technological progress, which has a negative impact
on the environment. Therefore, it is quite important to elucidate how endogenous tech-
nological change is a¤ected by strategic environmental regulations and how di¤erences
in environmental technologies between countries a¤ect global emissions. However, to our
knowledge, there exist no theoretical models rigorously dealing with endogenous techno-
logical change under the presence of international strategic interaction.
We present a simple two-country model to consider the di¤erence in countries re-
sponse in terms of adoption of new clean technologies to environmental policies. A unique
nal good generates transboundary pollution (greenhouse gas) as a by-product of pro-
duction. In order to mitigate pollution damage, the national government requires each
domestic rm to reduce its emissions. We identify and interpret the fundamental forces
for technological progress in a Nash equilibrium of the policy game.
Our model highlights the impact of environmental regulations on endogenous tech-
1According to Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2012), without
new policies, by 2050, global greenhouse gas emissions will increase by more than 50% compared with
the 2010 emissions, primarily due to a 70% growth in energy-related CO2 emissions. As a result, the
average global temperature is projected to be 3-C to 6-C higher than preindustrial levels by the end of
the century, which exceeds the globally agreed goal of limiting it to 2-C to prevent disruptive climate
change. See also Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2008).
2See, e.g., IPCC (2011) on renewable energy sources.
3See, for instance, Dasgupta et al. (2002) and Walz (2010) on a downward shift of the environmental
Kuznets curve (EKC), Gallagher (2006) on energy-technology leapfrogging in the Chinese automobile
industry, Huber (2008) who reviews the global di¤usion of environmental innovations, Perkins (2003)
who reviews environmental leapfrogging in developing countries, Watson and Sauter (2011) who review
case studies of leapfrogging (e.g., the Korean steel industry, the Indian and Chinese wind industries, and
bioethanol production in Brazil).
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nological change in the long run.4 As long as a country reduces pollutants, it learns
how to produce in an environmentally friendly manner at low cost. Learning-by-doing
determines whether a country has cleaner technologies than another country in the long
run. This learning process is supported by existing empirical evidence that an increase in
energy prices and environmental regulations not only reduces greenhouse gas emissions
by shifting behavior away from polluting activities, but also encourages environmentally
friendly innovation, which makes pollution control less costly in the long run (Newell et
al., 1999; Popp, 2002).
Two important results of this paper are as follows. First, we demonstrate that envi-
ronmental leapfrogging occurs under plausible conditions. As each country is assumed to
regulate its emissions to maximize individual welfare, a country that initially has a dirty
technology (an environmentally lagging country) tends to implement a stringent environ-
mental policy, due to international strategic interaction emerging in Nash equilibrium of
the policy game. As a result, learning-by-doing e¤ects are large in the lagging country
and its technology becomes environmentally friendly more rapidly than the other coun-
try that initially had a clean technology (an environmentally leading country). Thus, the
lagging countrys environmental friendliness could continue to increase until it exceeds
the leading countrys environmental friendliness. Each countrys friendliness converges
to a certain level in the long run because the government ceases to implement environ-
mental regulations when its technology is su¢ ciently clean. We can show that whether a
country eventually becomes an environmentally leading country depends on country size
and awareness of environmental quality.
Second, we nd the striking result that global pollution emissions may increase despite
the fact that environmental technology monotonically advances in both countries. Global
pollution emissions eventually become constant because both countries cease to tighten
environmental regulations when their technologies are su¢ ciently clean. Surprisingly,
however, the nal constant amount of emissions might be higher than the emissions
in early stages of adjustment under dirty technologies. In particular, if environmental
leapfrogging frequently occurs, long-term global pollution is likely to be lower than the
initial level.
The reason for this counterintuitive result is as follows. In our model, the technology
in the lagging country advances more rapidly than that in the leading country. This fea-
ture implies that technologies in the two countries advance considerably if both countries
experience a state of environmental lagging for many periods. That is, both countries
possess similarly clean technologies because leapfrogging occurs more frequently. This is
why the long-term level of global pollution can become low in the presence of leapfrog-
ging. However, when leapfrogging does not occur, the two countries will have di¤erent
environmental technologies in the long run. Under imbalanced technological progress,
technological change is not enough to reduce global pollution.
Our results suggest the importance of balanced technological change. Most of the
worlds research and development (R&D) for environmental innovation occurs in high-
income countries (e.g., Lanjouw and Mody, 1996). Dechezleprêtre et al. (2011) did nd
climate-friendly innovations in emerging Economies, but these innovations are limited.
While international transfers of climate-mitigation technologies occur mostly between
developed countries, technology transfers from developed countries to emerging countries
4We follow the endogenous growth model of Romer (1986) by assuming the learning-by-doing e¤ect
in production activities. In this paper, we consider, in particular, the learning e¤ect on advances in
environmental technology.
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are few in number, but have been rising rapidly in recent years.5 We need to accelerate
international transfers to mitigate the imbalanced technological change between countries
that could cause undesirable e¤ects on the environment.
This paper is closely related to the literature on the interactions between environmen-
tal regulations and endogenous technological change through R&D and learning-by-doing.
Bovenberg and Smulders (1996) examined the link between tighter environmental policy
and economic growth when the environmental R&D sector endogenously develops abate-
ment technologies. Goulder and Mathai (2000) explored policy-induced technological
change for the design of carbon-abatement policies when the channels of technological
progress are based on R&D and learning-by-doing. Acemoglu et al. (2012) considered
whether research can be directed to improving the productivity of clean and dirty inter-
mediate goods sectors and showed that sustainable long-run growth can be achieved with
temporary taxation of dirty innovation and production when the inputs are su¢ ciently
substitutable. Bosetti et al. (2008) and Fischer and Newell (2008) empirically assessed
the e¤ects of technological progress through learning, R&D, and knowledge spillovers.
None of these studies developed a two-country model to study the strategic interaction
of environmental policies between countries and the role of environmental leapfrogging.
Our contribution is to clarify the interaction of endogenous technological change between
countries.6
We also contribute to the international economics literature on leapfrogging. After
Brezis et al. (1993) found the fundamental mechanism through which leapfrogging occurs
in a simple Ricardian trade model with learning, various papers followed and identied
the driving forces of leapfrogging, which include comparative (dis)advantage, interna-
tional capital ows, and knowledge spillovers (Ohyama and Jones, 1995; Motta et al.,
1997; Brezis and Tsiddon, 1998; van de Klundert and Smulders, 2001; Desmet, 2002).7
The present paper contributes to this literature by considering leapfrogging in environ-
mentalleadership, while those papers do not address any environmental factors such as
pollution emissions or environmental policies. Our paper is also new to the literature in
nding a policy-based mechanism of leapfrogging. We demonstrate that environmental
leapfrogging may result from a policy game between governments with strategic inter-
actions in global emissions. In this sense, the leapfrogging in our model is not only a
technology-driven phenomenon, but also a policy-driven phenomenon. In the existing
literature, such policy-driven leapfrogging is not addressed.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our model of
endogenous technological change. Section 3 considers a Nash equilibrium of the policy
game. Section 4 explores a key mechanism underlying environmental leapfrogging. Sec-
tion 5 investigates the impact of leapfrogging on global pollution emissions and Section
6 concludes the article.
5Popp (2012) provided a comprehensive review of the literature on environmentally friendly techno-
logical change and technology transfers.
6In the literature on trade and the environment, the interaction of environmental policy interventions
is investigated using a two-country general equilibrium model, but technologies are exogenously given to
focus on the e¤ects of trade liberalization. See, e.g., Copeland and Taylor (2004).
7See Giovannetti (2001) for perpetual leapfrogging in a context of price competition between rms. In
addition, some literature in the eld of economic geography addresses both the theory and the empirical
evidence of technological leapfrogging at regional level; see, for example, Quah (1996a, b).
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2 Basic Model
Time is discrete extending from t = 0 to1: There are two countries, labeled by i = A; B:
In the basic model, we keep the two countries as symmetric as possible. They di¤er only
in initial environmental technological levels.8 There is a single consumption good, which
is taken as the numeraire. The consumption good is produced by perfectly competitive
rms in both countries. There are constant returns to scale, and the technology converts
one unit of (e¤ective) labor into one unit of a good. The (gross) marginal cost in country
i is thus equal to the wage rate, denoted as wi(t):
Industrial production emits pollutants. Assume that producing one unit of a good in
country i generates i(t) > 0 units of pollution. The variable i(t) captures how harmful
the production technology in country i is to the environment.
In this paper, we use two di¤erent words concerning the environment. The rst word
is awareness,to which we relate parameter ": This captures how uncomfortable people
feel about global pollutants. The second word is friendliness, relating to (i(t))
 1 :
This captures to what extent the production technology of a country generates pollution
emissions.
In this study, we highlight the governments role in controlling emissions. In order
to control the aggregate emission level, the national government of country i requires
each domestic rm to reduce its pollution by 100  i(t) %:We assume that every rm can
reduce one unit of emission by hiring one unit of (e¤ective) labor. The e¤ective marginal
cost for a rm to produce a unit of a good (with the inclusion of pollution reduction) is
equal to wi(t)(1 + i(t) i(t)): We may relate this rate  i(t) 2 [0; 1] to an environmental
policy instrument; higher  i(t) implies a stricter environmental policy.
In each country, there is a representative consumer who inelastically supplies L=2
units of (e¤ective) labor. The consumer in country i consumes Ci(t) units of the single
consumption good and is endowed with the following utility function:
ui(t) = Ci(t)  " (EA(t) + EB(t))2 ; (1)
where Ei(t) is the ow of pollution emission generated by country i and " > 0 denotes
the degree of environmental awareness.
We treat pollution as a ow although most environmental problems are stock ones.
The reason is as follows. First, if the depreciation rate of the pollution stock is high (e.g.,
the natural rate of removal of atmospheric pollution is high), the ow assumption may
be a reasonable approximation (e.g., Schou, 2002; Grimaud and Tournemaine, 2007).
Second, it simplies the analysis without altering the main insight of our paper.
3 Short-run Equilibrium
In this section, we will characterize the short-run equilibrium of our model under given
environmental technologies. Although our model is very simple, its equilibrium behavior
appears to be complex. To explain this, rst, we will see the consumers and rms
optimal activities in market equilibrium. Then, we will characterize the governments
optimal environmental policy in a Nash equilibrium of the policy game played by the two
countries.
8In Section 4.3, we will investigate the roles of heterogeneity between the countries.
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3.1 Market Equilibrium
Assuming that rms of the two countries supply their products to the integrated world
market, the e¤ective marginal costs must be equated between the two countries. Thus
we have wA(t) ((1 + A(t)A(t)) = wB(t) (1 + B(t)B(t)) = 1: The equilibrium wages
are obtained as
wi(t) =
1
1 + i(t) i(t)
: (2)
The labor market equilibrium conditions determine the equilibrium levels of national
output equal to
Yi(t) =
L=2
1 + i(t) i(t)
: (3)
We thus obtain the indirect utility function as
ui(t) =
L=2
1 + i(t) i(t)
  "
0@ X
i2fA;Bg
Ei(t)
1A2 ; (4)
where the pollution is given by
Ei(t) = (1   i(t)) Li(t)=2
1 + i(t) i(t)
(5)
for i = A and B:
3.2 Optimal Policy Equilibrium
The government in each country, say i; controls their environmental policy tool  i(t)
so as to maximize utility, given their foreign policy  j(t): An environmental policy re-
action function is dened as  i (t; 

j(t)) = argmax i(t)2[0;1] ui(t): Solving this nonlinear
optimization problem with (4) derives the environmental policy reaction function as
 i (t; 

j(t)) =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 if "L  1
1+i(t)

i(t) +
j(t)(1 j (t))
1+j(t)j (t)
 1
ei(t) otherwise
1 if "L  1
1+i(t)

j(t)(1 j (t))
1+j(t)j (t)
 1 ; (6)
where
ei(t) =
"L  1
i(t)

1
1+i(t)
  j(t)(1 

j (t))
1+j(t)j (t)
"L

"L+

1
1+i(t)
  j(t)(1 

j (t))
1+j(t)j (t)
"L
 : (7)
Equation (6) suggests a possibility of so-called carbon leakage. As  i (t; 

j(t)) is glob-
ally a decreasing function in  j(t); the government of Country i responds to a tightened
foreign environmental policy (an increase in  j(t)) by weakening the domestic policy (a
decrease in  i(t)). Thus, a part of the emissions reduction in Country j may be o¤set
by an increase in emissions in Country i: At the aggregate level, a tightening of the en-
vironmental policy in one country may increase global emissions, showing the possibility
of carbon leakage.
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Next let us think of a Nash equilibrium in the environmental policy game played
between the two governments. Denote as ( A(t); 

B(t)) a pair of policy strategies taken
in the Nash equilibrium. This equilibrium pair of policies can be calculated as a solution
to the system consisting of the two optimal policy equations:  A(t) = 

A(t; 

B(t)) and
 B(t) = 

B(t; 

A(t)): To derive the equilibrium policies, rst, it is useful to note two
basic facts. First, ( A(t); 

B(t)) = (1; 1) and (

A(t); 

B(t)) = (eA(t); eB(t)) cannot be
Nash equilibria.9 Second, if the world pollution level A(t) + B(t) is su¢ ciently low,
both countries do not adopt an environmental policy:
( A(t); 

B(t)) = (0; 0) if A(t) + B(t) < min
i2fA;Bg

1
"L (1 + i(t))

: (8)
By using (6) and (7), we can easily obtain the equilibrium pair of the environmental
policy in the following.10 Dene ^ such that ^ = 1=("L (1 + ^)). With i 6= j; the
equilibrium policy pair is characterized by
( i (t); 

j(t)) =
8>>><>>>:
(pi(t); 0) if
min
n
i(t);
1
"L(1+i(t))
o
> j(t)  1"L(1+i(t))   i(t)
(1; 0) if ^ > j(t) > 1"L(1+i(t))
(1; qj(t)) if i(t) > j(t)  ^
; (9)
where we dene two functions in t; pi(t) and qj(t); that satisfy 0 < qi(t) < pj(t) < 1:
Formal denitions of these two functions are
pi(t) 
"L  1
i(t)

1
1+i(t)
 "Lj(t)

"L+

1
1+i(t)
 "Lj(t)
 and qj(t)  "L 
1
j(t)
1
1+j(t)
"L+ 1
1+j(t)
: (10)
By using (8) and (9) with (10), Figure 1 relates the environmental technologies of
both countries, (A(t); B(t)); to their environmental equilibrium policies, ( A(t); 

B(t));
in (8) and (9). These complex equations and gures simply imply that the country that
has a dirtier technology (larger i(t)) is more willing to impose stricter environmental
restrictions (larger  i(t)). We can formally prove our main result.
Theorem 1 A country with a less environmentally friendly technology tends to imple-
ment a stricter environmental policy in equilibrium;  i (t)   j(t) if i(t) > j(t):
Theorem 1 implies that a country with dirtier technologies would reduce more pol-
lutants by implementing a stricter environmental policy. This results from international
strategic interactions emerging in a Nash equilibrium of the policy game. As shown in the
next two sections, this will deliver some important results on environmental leapfrogging
and global pollution dynamics.
9The proof is as follows. Substituting ej(t) into ei(t) results in
i (t)
i(t)
+ 1

i(t)
2"(1+i(t))
  j(t)2"(1+j(t))

= 0: This does not hold in general because i (t) > 0:
10See Appendix A for detailed derivations.
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4 Technological Leadership in the Environment
In this section, we will introduce an endogenous process through which the environmental
technology in either country advances. We will demonstrate that the environmental
technological progress in either country interacts with each other to result in international
cycles in environmental technological leadership.
We provide a formal denition of environmental technological leadership and leapfrog-
ging. Firstly, we dene environmental technological leadership as the state whereby a
given country has the most environmentally friendly technology among all countries.
Thus, we refer to a country that has a lower i(t) as an environmentally leading country.
A country with a higher i(t) is called an environmentally lagging country. We may say
that environmental leapfroggingoccurs if environmental leadership shifts between the
countries, i.e., if i(t) < j(t) changes to i(t + 1) > j(t + 1) with i 6= j: Without loss
of generality, we assume A(0) < B(0) holds in period 0 (initial period). Country A is
initially an environmentally leading country.
4.1 Learning-by-doing and Technological Progress
We incorporate endogenous environmental technological progress into the model by con-
sidering a learning-by-doing e¤ect,11 basically following the endogenous growth literature
(Romer, 1986). To highlight a possibility of environmental leapfrogging, we will assume
a simplied version of learning-by-doing. However, if we thought of a more general and
realistic setting on learning by doing, as in Young (1991), our main result would not
change qualitatively. We believe that using such a simple setting is benecial for us to
show our main story in a clear-cut way. Namely, as we will demonstrate below, an envi-
ronmentally lagging country may be able to accumulate experience on environmentally
friendly activities faster than a leading country, since, as Theorem 1 shows, it implements
a stricter environmental policy.
Our basic assumption is that a country that reduces pollutants learns how to produce
in an environmentally friendly manner. Suppose
i(t+ 1) = i(t)  i(t); (11)
through which the pollution level of technology i(t) decreases over time to the extent
i(t)  0: Then we assume that the decrease in pollution level i(t) is a function of the
pollutant reduction made by country i;  i (t)i(t)Yi(t); i.e., i(t) = (

i (t)i(t)Yi(t); t):
We put two natural assumptions on learning function : (a) there is no advance if there
is no environmental activity ((0; t) = 0 for any t  0); (b) in each period t; a rm that
invests more in pollution reduction learns more on how to produce in an environmentally
friendly manner ((z0; t) > (z; t) as z0 > z for any t  0): It can be shown that,
in equilibrium,  i (t)i(t)Yi(t) monotonically increases with 

i (t); thus, we may rewrite
the learning function as i(t) = (

i (t); t); keeping the two assumptions (a) and (b) in
function :
With (11), we can determine the direction in which international environmental friend-
liness, (A(t); B(t)); advances over time. Figure 2 depicts a usual phase diagram, in
which A(t) (B(t)) is measured along the horizontal (vertical) axis. Note that the time
index t is omitted in this gure.
11See Newell et al. (1999) and Popp (2002) for empirical evidence.
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As shown in Figure 2, there are three patterns of the direction in which (A(t); B(t))
moves over time. First, in the region of (0; 0), there are no technological advances in
which both countries do not engage in the environmental (pollution-reducing) activity
( i (t) = 0 for i = A; B). Here (A(t); B(t)) never moves and is stable. Second, in the
regions of (pA; 0) and (1; 0) ((0; pB) and (0; 1)), only country A (B) invests labor resources
in the abatement. Therefore, only A(t) (B(t)) decreases over time by assumption (a).
This fact is indicated by the left arrow (down arrow) within those regions. Third, in
the region of (1; qB) ((qA; 1)), both countries make the environmental investment. As
 A(t) > 

B(t) (

A(t) < 

B(t)) holds, A(t) (B(t)) decreases more sharply than B(t)
(A(t)) does because of assumption (b). This is indicated by the long left arrow and
the shorter down arrow (the long down arrow and the shorter left arrow). A typical
trajectory, starting from point K0; is illustrated by dotted arrows in Figure 2.
4.2 Environmental Leapfrogging
Take an example path starting from K0 in Figure 2, in which A(0) < B(0): Along an
equilibrium path from K0; as can be shown by using the phase diagram, environmental
leadership may shift between the two countries. At rst, country A is the leader with
lower A(t) and it retains its environmental leadership in the subsequent periods 1   4:
Along the equilibrium path, leapfrogging occurs in period 5; country B becomes a new
environmental leader.
We can formally identify this possibility of environmental leapfrogging. Recall that
by (9) and Figure 1, the equilibrium environmental policy pair is ( A(0); 

B(0)) =
(0; 0); (0; pB(0)) ; (0; 1); or (qA(0); 1): Dene a new threshold value ~ such that 2~ =
1=("L (1 + ~)): See Figure 3. If an initial point exists in the blue region in Figure 3 (a),
like point k0; the environmental friendliness pair (A(t); B(t)) will eventually fall below
the 45 degree line. The blue region is characterized by
B(0) > A(0) 2 (~; ^): (12)
See Figure 3 (b), in which the red region corresponds to
B(0) > A(0)  ^: (13)
If the pair (A(t); B(t)) exists such as k00 in the red region in Figure 3 (b), it may
eventually either fall below the 45 degree line or move to the blue region of (12). This is
guaranteed by assuming that the extent of technological progress that takes place within
a period is not too large, i.e., there exists some  > 0 such that (; t) < .12 Given this
assumption, if (13) holds, we can show that environmental leadership will eventually shift
internationally.
Taking into account (12) and (13) with Theorem 1, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Environmental Leapfrogging) Think of an environmentally leading
country A and an environmentally lagging country B with A(0) < B(0): If the extent
of technological progress taking place within a period is not too large, so long as
A(0) > ~; (14)
12If a step of technological progress was very large, (A(t); B(t)) might immediately jump into the
grey region of (0; 0); in which case leapfrogging never takes place.
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the environmental leadership initially retained by country A will eventually shift to the
initial lagging country B; environmental leapfrogging takes place.
To determine our understanding of environmental policy from this result, let us re-
view our result on a step-by-step basis. Initially, country A is an environmentally leading
country with A(0) < B(0): As the environmentally lagging country B is more polluting,
it requires domestic rms to reduce pollutants more by adopting a stricter environmental
policy, i.e.,  B(0) > 

A(0) (Theorem 1). Through the learning process, the lagging coun-
try Bs technology thus becomes environmentally friendly more rapidly than the leading
country As technology does. If the technology of the leading country A were initially
environmentally friendly enough to satisfy A(0) < ~, the world economy would get to
the equilibrium without any environmental regulations ( i (t) = 0). However, as the lead-
ing country A is initially not very environmentally friendly by (14), the lagging countrys
friendliness continues to increase until it exceeds the leading countrys. Therefore, if (14)
holds, the environmental leadership eventually shifts internationally.
What happens after the rst environmental leapfrogging takes place? The answer
to this question is that a second leapfrogging may follow the rst. See Figure 2, in
which K5 moves horizontally in the subsequent period 6. Imagine that K5 crosses the
45 degree line, so the technological leadership shifts internationally again in period 6:
However, in the long run, leapfrogging necessarily ceases to exist because the world econ-
omys friendliness pair (A(t); B(t)) eventually converges to the grey region in Figure
2, in which ( A(t); 

B(t)) = (0; 0) and (A(t); B(t)) stays constant. Denote by (

A; 

B)
the point that (A(t); B(t)) nally reaches in the grey region. Whether A > 

B or
A < 

B is not determinate, depending in a complex fashion on the initial friendliness
levels (A(0); B(0)): That is, which country ultimately becomes an environmentally lead-
ing country is indeterminate. This indeterminacy essentially comes from the symmetry
between the countries (which di¤er only in i(t)).
4.3 Which Country Prevails? The Role of Country Heterogene-
ity
So far, we have demonstrated that environmental leapfrogging may occur if the leading
countrys technology is initially not so environmentally friendly. So long as countries
are essentially identical, in the analysis above, which country prevails is not determined.
A fundamental question arises as to which country becomes the ultimate environmental
leader in the long run. In this subsection, we will give an answer to this question by
allowing for country heterogeneity.
Suppose that one country is relatively aware of the environment, say country A;
and the other has a large amount of e¤ective labor (i.e., population times their labor
productivity), say country B: Denote as Li and "i the e¤ective labor and environmental
awareness of country i, where i = A, B: Then, "A  "B and LA  LB: Equilibrium
optimal policies are shown in Figure 4. (See Appendix A for mathematical details.)
Figure 4 (a), by setting "A = "B and LA < LB; shows how the di¤erence in in-
ternational e¤ective labor sizes a¤ects the equilibrium policies. Dene ^i such that
^i = 1=("iLi (1 + ^i)): Because ^B is lower than ^A in this case, the stable region (0; 0)
is twisted with a rightward bias. In fact, as LB increases, ^B decreases and ^A increases.
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Therefore, when country Bs e¤ective labor LB is very large, A > B (where coun-
try B is the leader) holds almost everywhere in the stable region (0; 0): Given that the
world economy eventually moves into the stable region (0; 0), we can say that a county
with large e¤ective labor is more likely to eventually obtain the environmental leadership
(A > B).
Remark 1 A country that has a large amount of e¤ective labor tends to eventually be-
come an environmental leader in the long run.
The implication of Remark 1 is as follows. A large amount of e¤ective labor implies a
huge potential pollution emission. Thus, the government of country B would implement
long-term environmental policy that promotes the technological progress as a by-product.
Therefore, given its large e¤ective labor, country B may tend to obtain environmental
leadership eventually, even if it is initially an environmentally lagging country.
Heterogeneity of environmental awareness, "A > "B; determines which country nally
retains the environmental leadership. See Figure 4 (b), with the denition of  where
2(1+)  1="A; which means  = ("A) with 0("A) < 0: Starting from any point in the
red-box region (where B(t) <  and B(t) < A(t)); B(t) < A(t) holds in the long run.
Outside the red-box region, any path eventually converges to a state with B(t) > A(t);
where country A is the leading country. As, by 0("A) < 0; the red-box region becomes
smaller as "A increases, we have the following statement.
Remark 2 A country that has greater awareness of the environment tends to become an
environmental leader in the long run.
The implication of Remark 2 is straightforward. Given its greater environmental
awareness "A; country A is more likely to adopt a stricter environmental policy. It follows
that the learning-by-doing e¤ect works more actively in country A, which would advance
environmental technology in country A faster (decreasing A(t) faster than B(t)).
5 Global Pollution Dynamics
How does environmental leapfrogging a¤ect global pollution dynamics? To answer this
fundamental question, we assume that the two countries di¤er only in their technolog-
ical friendliness; A(t) < B(t). Using (5), (9), and (10), we will elaborate how global
pollution, E(t) = EA(t)+EB(t); changes over time in each stage of environmental devel-
opment.
Stage I:
Consider an earlier stage of environmental technology development, in which both
countries adopt an environmental policy, ( A(t); 

B(t)) = (qA(t); 1) : In this case, as
shown in the phase diagram in Figure 2, environmental technology advances in both
countries; both A(t) and B(t) decreases over time. By (5), (9), and (10), we have
E(t) =
1
2" (1 + A(t))
 e1A(t) as 1"L(1+A(t)) < A(t) : (15)
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Surprisingly, we nd that, during this early stage (stage I), global pollution increases as
environmental technologies in the leading country advance. That is, E(t) increases as
A(t) decreases.
Stage II:
The second stage is with ( A(t); 

B(t)) = (0; 1) ; where, as shown in Figure 2, techno-
logical progress takes place only for the lagging country. Only B(t) decreases over time.
Global emissions in this case can be calculated as
E(t) =
A(t)L
2
 e2A(t) as 1"L(1+B(t)) < A(t) < 1"L(1+A(t)) : (16)
While the leading country generates a constant amount of pollution, the lagging country
reduces all of its pollution emissions. Therefore, it is clear that global pollution is kept
constant. That is, E(t) never changes while B(t) decreases over time.
A fundamental question is whether global pollution rises or declines in the period
of regime switching from stages I to II. The answer is not clear and global pollution
depends on the extent of technological progress that takes place within that period.
Suppose that regime switching from stage I to II occurs from periods t to t + 1. If the
extent of technological progress in the leading country, i.e., A(t); is reasonably large,
global pollution may be reduced with this regime switching; E(t+1) < E(t) may hold.13
Stage III:
Next, think of a more advanced stage of environmental technology development with
( A(t); 

B(t)) = (0; pB(t)) : In this case, as in stage II, only B(t) decreases over time.
We can obtain
E(t) =
1
2" (1 + B(t))
 e3A(t) as A(t) < 1"L(1+B(t)) < A(t) + B(t) ; (17)
global emissions start to increase again. In a regime switch from stages II to III, global
pollution necessarily increases.14
Stage IV:
Finally, if both countries have a su¢ ciently clean technology such that if A(t) +
B(t) <
1
"L(1+B(t))
, they do not need environmental regulation; ( A(t); 

B(t)) = (0; 0) :
In this case, global pollution is given by
E(t) =
(A(t) + B(t))L
2
 e4(t) as A(t) + B(t) < 1"L(1+B(t)) ; (18)
global pollution emissions are constant. In a regime switch from stages III to IV, us-
ing a simple numerical example, we can show that global emissions can be reduced if
technological progress for the lagging country, B(t); is reasonably large.
Consequently we have the following proposition.
13To verify this, consider a numerical example with L = 0:5 and " = 0:5: Assume (A(t); B(t)) =
(1:75; 4:5) and (A(t+ 1); B(t+ 1)) = (1; 3:5) : Then, regime switching occurs from t to t + 1; noting
(15) and (16). Furthermore, E(t) = 0:36364 declines to E(t+ 1) = 0:25:
14Suppose that the world goes from stages II to III in periods t+ 1 to t+ 2: By (16) and (17), noting
A(t+ 1) = A(t+ 2) in stage II, we can easily verify E(t+ 1) < E(t+ 2).
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Proposition 2 (Global Pollution) In the process of environmental technological progress,
global pollution E(t) may increase over time and eventually stays at (A(t) + B(t))L=2:
To explore the global pollution dynamics in detail, we consider two numerical examples
that, respectively, capture the typical trajectories of global pollution, fE(t)g:15 We take
" = L = 0:5 and think of (A(t  1); B(t  1)) = (2:5; 7:5) as an initial state.
In the rst example, (a), we assume that technological progress follows (i(t); k(t)) =
(2; 0:75) if  i (t) > 

k(t) > 0 and (2; 0) if 

i (t) > 

k(t) = 0; which is consistent with
the learning rules that we assume. The complete path of global pollution E(t) is illus-
trated in Figure 5 (a). In period t   1; (A(t  1); B(t  1)) = (2:5; 7:5) satises the
inequality condition in (15), so that the world economy is in the earliest stage I, where
( A(t  1);  B(t  1)) = (qA(t); 1) : By (15), global pollution is E(t   1) ' 0:28571: Ac-
cording to the above simple process of technological progress, environmental friendliness
improves for both the leading and the lagging countries: (A(t); B(t)) = (1:75; 5:5) holds
in period t; in which the inequality condition in (15) still holds (stage I). Then, global
pollution increases to E(t) ' 0:36364: By analogous calculations, we can characterize an
entire trajectory for this example: E(t+1) = 0:25 in stage II, E(t+2) = 0:4 in stage III,
and E(t + 3) = 0:375 in stage IV with (A(t+ 3); B(t+ 3)) = (1; 0:5). In this example
without leapfrogging, global emissions uctuates and eventually increases up to 0:375;
which is higher than the initial level (0:28571).
We then consider another example, (b), in which leapfrogging plays a role. It di¤ers
from example (a) only in that technological progress is slower: (i(t); k(t)) = (1; 0:3)
if  i (t) > 

k(t) > 0 and (1; 0) if 

i (t) > 

k(t) = 0; which is also consistent with the
learning rules that we assume. The entire path is depicted in Figure 5 (b). In period
t   1; the world economy is in stage I where country A is the leading country, and
E(t   1) ' 0:28571. Then, global pollution monotonically increases in stage I up to
period t+2: In the subsequent periods, t+3 and t+4; the world economy shifts to stage
II with a small decrease in pollution, E(t+ 3) = E(t+ 4) = 0:325: Next, in period t+ 5;
stage III occurs and pollution increases to E(t + 5) = 0:4: In period t + 6; leapfrogging
occurs; country B becomes a new leading country with (A(t+ 6); B(t+ 6)) = (1:3; 0:5) :
While leapfrogging occurs, the world economy is still in stage III and pollution continues
to increase to E(t + 6) = 0:43478: In period t + 7; (A(t+ 7); B(t+ 7)) = (0:3; 0:5)
follows; leapfrogging occurs again and stage IV occurs in period t + 7, in which country
A gets the leadership back and global pollution sharply decreases down to E(t+7) = 0:2
through regime switching to stage IV. In this example with leapfrogging, global pollution
uctuates at rst, but nally declines to the lowest level (0:2).
These two examples suggest that global pollution is likely to decline through leapfrog-
ging in the long run. This is essentially because, in our model, the technology in the
lagging country advances more rapidly than that in the leading country as a result of the
policy game with international strategic interactions. Technologies in the two countries
advance considerably and similarly if both countries experience the state of a lagging
country for more periods. This implies that technological progress may be more balanced
between the two countries as leapfrogging occurs more frequently. In that sense, envi-
ronmental leapfrogging may lead to more balanced technological progress in the world,
thereby reducing global pollution in the long run.
15See Appendix B for detailed calculations.
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A striking feature of this result is that global pollution emissions may increase despite
the fact that environmental technology monotonically advances in both countries. The
intuition behind the result is as follows. Changes in pollution can be decomposed into
two fundamental forces: scale and technique e¤ects. As shown in Grossman and Krueger
(1993), the scale e¤ect measures the increase in pollution that would be generated if the
economy was simply scaled up, holding all else constant; the technique e¤ect captures
reduction in pollution caused by a fall in emissions intensity, holding all else constant.
In our model, strict environmental policy in the early stage of environmental technology
development induces rapid technological progress, which reduces pollution (the technique
e¤ect). As technological change is external to the economy, the government implements
a too-strict environmental policy in the early stage compared with the case where tech-
nological change is internalized. The government will mitigate environmental policy after
it discovers technological progress. That is, the technique e¤ect becomes small as time
proceeds. As technological progress enables a country to save labor input used for abate-
ment activity, more labor can be employed in production of the good. This causes an
increase in pollution (the scale e¤ect). The scale e¤ect decreases as technological progress
becomes slow.
Given that the scale e¤ect dominates, an increase in global pollution over time implies
that production increases over time. We can easily verify that in terms of utility, the
increase in the output dominates the increase in pollution. As environmental technology
improves, utility increases over time. This would suggest an important role for a nice
balance of production (economic growth) and the environment.
Proposition 2 may suggest that the scale e¤ect in some cases plays a dominant role
in the real-world economy, where environmental technology advances, but emissions also
increase. In other words, the real world is still in intermediate stages, IIII, in which pol-
lution emissions never decrease without regime switching. Given this, our result predicts
that the observed emission expansion in the world economy, together with the output
increase, may stop eventually if regime switching occurs, i.e., if the environmental tech-
nology becomes su¢ ciently clean and the world economy goes to the nal stage, IV, as
in example (b).
Our model may explain the underlying cause of the EKC. The EKC is a hypothesized
inverted U-shaped relation between environmental quality and economic development.16
In our model, production will increase over time because environmental technology ad-
vances through learning-by-doing e¤ects. Our results shown in Figure 5 suggest that there
is an inverted U-shaped relationship between pollution and time (or economic growth)
if environmental leapfrogging occurs frequently. That is, balanced technological progress
between countries could be a key factor for the EKC relationship in the world economy.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we constructed a simple two-country model with global pollution and
endogenous technological progress induced by learning-by-doing. We characterized the
structure of equilibria and the dynamic environmental policies that achieve technological
progress or leapfrogging. Long-term global emissions and the dynamic path of environ-
mental friendliness are related to the initial environmental friendliness, environmental
16See, for example, Dinda (2004) and Stern (2004) for a survey based on the EKC hypothesis.
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awareness, and learning process between countries. Our ndings underscore the impor-
tance of considering the implications of technological progress in a multicountry frame-
work.
The important implications of our results are as follows. (i) Leapfrogging may occur
under reasonable conditions. Countries are likely to possess similar clean technologies in
the long run when leapfrogging occurs frequently. (ii) A country that has a large amount
of e¤ective labor and/or considerable environmental awareness tends to be an environ-
mental leader in the long run. (iii) Imbalanced adoption of new clean technologies among
countries is not always good for the environment. Global emissions can be mitigated by
controlling technological change to be uniform between countries. This needs to have
international coordination such as technology transfers and capacity building.
We have built a simple general equilibrium model to shed some light on the issue of
development and adoption of new clean technologies to control global emissions. It is
certainly worthwhile to build alternative models to more deeply understand the mecha-
nism underlying international di¤erences in technological progress. The following are in
particular worth mentioning and have been left for future research. First, our analysis
does not consider dynamic optimization because we treat pollution as a ow to derive
clear-cut results. However, it is interesting to investigate the issue when pollution is a
stock variable. Second, technological progress might be reinforced if the national gov-
ernment considers not only negative externalities caused by pollution, but also positive
externalities of learning-by-doing. Third, the channel for knowledge growth could be
by R&D investments as well as learning-by-doing. Last, there is no terms-of-trade ef-
fect because we have used a one-good model. Environmental regulations are a¤ected by
terms-of-trade e¤ects, which could change the long-term pace of technological progress.
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Appendix A
The case with homogeneous countries. Assume i(t) > j(t): By substituting ( i (t); 

i (t)) =
(ei(t); 0) and ( A(t); 

B(t)) = (1; ej(t)) into (6) and (7), we have
ei(t) =
"L  1
i(t)

1
1+i(t)
  "Lj(t)

"L+

1
1+i(t)
  "Lj(t)
 (A1)
and
ej(t) =
"L  1
j(t)
1
1+j(t)
"L+ 1
1+j(t)
; (A2)
respectively. With (A1) and (A2), noting 0  ei(t)  1 and 0  ej(t)  1 would imply
(9), given the denitions of pi(t) and qi(t):
The case with heterogeneous countries. The reaction function becomes
 i (t; 

j(t)) =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 if "i  11+i(t)

i(t)Li +
j(t)(1 j (t))
1+j(t)j (t)
Lj
 1
ei(t) otherwise
1 if "i  11+i(t)

j(t)(1 j (t))
1+j(t)j (t)
Lj
 1 ; (A3)
where
ei(t) =
"iLi   1i(t)

1
1+i(t)
  j(t)(1 

j (t))
1+j(t)j (t)
"iLj

"iLi +

1
1+i(t)
  j(t)(1 

j (t))
1+j(t)j (t)
"iLj
 : (A4)
Dene ^i such that ^i  1"iLi(1+^i) : Then, using (A3) and (A4), the equilibrium policy
pair goes to
( i (t); 

j(t)) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
(0; 0) if A(t)LA + B(t)LB  mini2fA;Bg
n
1
"i(1+i(t))
o
(pi(t); 0) if
min
n
"i
"j

i(t) +
"i "j
"i

; 1
"iLj(1+i(t))
o
> j(t)  1"iLj(1+i(t))   i(t)LiLj
(1; 0) if ^j > j(t) > 1"iLj(1+i(t))
(1; qj(t)) if "i"j

i(t) +
"i "j
"i

> j(t)  ^j
; (A5)
where
pi(t) =
"iLi  1i(t)

1
1+i(t)
 j(t)"iLj

"iLi+

1
1+i(t)
 j(t)"iLj
 and qi(t) = "iLi  1i(t) 11+i(t)"iLi+ 11+i(t) : (A6)
It is straightforward to illustrate Figure 4 by using the above equilibrium conditions.
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Appendix B
In both examples, we think of (A(t  1); B(t  1)) = (2:5; 7:5) as an initial point.
Set " = L = 0:5:
Example (a): Technological progress follows (i(t); k(t)) = (2; 0:75) if 

i (t) > 

k(t) >
0 with (2; 0) if  i (t) > 

k(t) = 0; which is consistent with the learning rules that we
assume.
As (A(t  1); B(t  1)) = (2:5; 7:5) ; the world is in stage I by (15), and E(t  
1) = 1
1+2:5
' 0:28571: Given the values of i(t) assumed, it goes to (A(t); B(t)) =
(1:75; 5:5) : By (15), the world is also in stage I and we have E(t) = 1
1+1:75
' 0:36364:
In the subsequent period t+ 1; it becomes (A(t+ 1); B(t+ 1)) = (1; 3:5) : Noting (16),
the world shifts to stage II in period t + 1: We can calculate E(t + 1) = 0:25: Next,
(A(t+ 2); B(t+ 2)) = (1; 1:5) satises the inequality condition in (17), so it is in stage
III and E(t+ 2) = 1
1+1:5
= 0:4: Finally, it goes to (A(t+ 3); B(t+ 3)) = (1; 0:5) ; which
satises (18). In period t + 3; the world moves to the terminal stage IV and we can
calculate E(t+ 3) = 1:5
4
= 0:375:
Example (b): Technological progress follows (i(t); k(t)) = (1; 0:3) if 

i (t) > 

k(t) >
0 and (1; 0) if  i (t) > 

k(t) = 0; which is consistent with the learning rules that we
assume.
Note that (A(t  1); B(t  1)) = (2:5; 7:5) ensures stage I for country A as a leading
country, noting (15). We calculate E(t 1) = 1
1+2:5
' 0:28571: Then, through the assumed
process of technological progress, stage I continues in periods t to t+ 2: (A(t); B(t)) =
(2:2; 6:5) ; (A(t+ 1); B(t+ 1)) = (1:9; 5:5) ; and (A(t+ 2); B(t+ 2)) = (1:6; 4:5) while
E(t) = 1
1+2:2
' 0:3125; E(t + 1) = 1
1+1:9
' 0:34483; and E(t + 2) = 1
1+1:6
' 0:38462:
In periods t + 3 and t + 4; it goes to (1:3; 3:5) and then (1:3; 2:5) ; in which case the
world is in stage II noting (16). Then E(t + 3) = E(t + 4) = 1:3
4
= 0:325: Next,
(A(t+ 5); B(t+ 5)) = (1:3; 1:5) ; which satises (17). It is stage III and E(t + 5) =
1
1+1:5
= 0:4: In period t+6; it goes to (1:3; 0:5) ; in which leapfrogging occurs and Country
B is a new leading country. An analogous inequality to that in (17), B(t) < 1"L(1+A(t)) <
A(t) + B(t); is satised, so that the world is in stage III, E(t + 6) = 11+1:3 = 0:43478:
Finally, it goes to (A(t+ 7); B(t+ 7)) = (0:3; 0:5); in which leapfrogging occurs again.
Country A regains the leadership and it satises (18), stage IV. Then we calculate E(t+
7) = 0:8
4
= 0:2:
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